THE HOWARD HOSPITAL, ZIMBABWE: Financial issues and Failures

The track record for the financial issues involving Howard Hospital is disturbing. Over the last 20 years, there are a number of recorded instances where monetary and material gifts from foreign donors were delayed, misappropriated, misspent, or simply vanished.

Reserve account monies in the name of Howard Hospital totaling approximately US$42,000 went missing in the 1990’s when Harare THQ changed banks. THQ held all Army accounts, including that of Howard Hospital. A review of the bottom line of all monies held by Harare THQ reflected no loss or shortages of monies ; however, the balance sheet for Howard Hospital was mysteriously short a full $42,000. This was waved off as a mistake in bookkeeping and presumably entered as a ‘correction’..

A new facility was planned to replace the old Howard facility, with construction to begin in 2000. The project was doomed to fail from the beginning. The Territorial Commander at the time, Commissioner Amos Makina, spear-headed the project. The architect engaged had no professional experience in the complex field of designing a hospital, and was incapable of designing one in the African bush and this was noted when Makina was finally persuaded to share the plans with Major (Dr.) Jim Watt the Chief Medical Officer. Not only was the design inadequate for the intended purpose, it was also under-funded at US$1million. A more realistic figure was 3.5 times that when inflation, and other on spot payments were included in the total.  The plans were re-worked to fill the requirements of a bush hospital and approval was given to begin the project. 

IHQ provided an officer to oversee the project and the accounting; Commissioner Makina stonewalled him and kept him from doing either. At the conclusion of building, the project ended up costing US$2million, twice the original estimate.

Sadly however, in the end, the new facility was deemed unfit for its intended use, by the Zimbabwe government. Having never been used, it sits there near the old facility, dilapidated and falling apart. A colossal waste of money.

Donations had a habit of being delayed or disappearing altogether. Consequently, on an ever increasing and demanding schedule Dr. Paul Thistle had to rely on direct donations to keep the hospital operational, with donations often hand-delivered by volunteers or handed directly to him at fundraising events he conducted in Canada during his furlough periods. The direct donations were deposited directly into the Howard Hospital operating account, bypassing the administrative fees assessed by the different Salvation Army HQs as a donation passed through the official donation chain.

The Salvation Army has a long-standing policy of assessing a 10% administrative fee for monies passed through its books in transit to other Salvation Army entities. Therefore, Army policy dictated that a donation submitted at a divisional HQ level would have to be assessed at a 10% fee prior to forwarding the remaining monies to territorial HQ. Then THQ could assess a 10% fee before passing it to IHQ; IHQ could assess a further 10% fee before passing it to the receiving territory, which would assess yet another 10% fee before depositing the remaining balance into the operating account of the destination entity.

In the case of Howard Hospital, Canadian DHQs often waived their assessment fee, as did Canada THQ. It is unknown if IHQ assessed a fee on transferred funds, although we have no reason to believe that they waived it. However, the assessment fee of 10%, and sometimes more, was levied on incoming donations into Harare THQ. There are first-hand accounts of Commissioner Chigariro requiring a 30% assessment fee against designated funds coming into Harare specifically earmarked for mission-based projects in Zimbabwe.

Dr. Thistle’s actions in obtaining direct donations and which bypassed the assessment channels could not be tolerated by Commissioner Chigariro, and she therefore terminated the volunteer medical professionals program, instituted by Thistle, and set about to engage a more pliable doctor as her man in charge of Howard.

Without his knowledge, various charges were brought up against Dr. Paul Thistle at IHQ until his reputation suffered causing a shadow of doubt on his credibility among IHQ and THQ officers. All this is in sharp contrast with the views of the Zimbabwe people at all levels, and fellow doctors and renowned surgeons who think very highly of him and celebrate his achievements. So when Chigariro asked for Dr. Thistle to be removed, the General consented (acquiesced to the demands of Chigariro and Makina) and tasked Commissioner Makina, International Secretary for Africa, and Chigariro to carry out the order, which they did in a vindictive manner that was negligent in not providing (even a year later) a replacement for his skills, nor assuring a continuity of the antiretroviral programs in place for those suffering with AIDS.

FSAOF (Names of contributors on file)